We find that earnings quality (EQ) is reliably negatively correlated with the market values of equity of firms listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (IDX
T he assumed relation between earnings quality (EQ) and the market value of equity is positive -more EQ leads to higher market values of equity (e.g. Gaio and Raposo 2011) . However, several existing accounting and finance studies of firms using data on the Indonesian capital market indicate that the role of the financial reporting process in Indonesia may be different from that of other (developed) capital markets. For example, an early study by Siregar and Utama (2008) finds that earnings management in Indonesia tends to be contractually efficient rather than opportunistic. The focus in their study is on corporate governance (CG) factors in Indonesia, but setting aside CG issues, their results show that current earnings' components (CFO, NDACC, DACC) are correlated with future profitability (CFO, EARN, EARN). In a later study, Siagian et al. (2013) report that even after formally controlling for CG factors, their financial reporting score is reliably negatively correlated with firm valuation and profitability. This finding is striking at first glance, as their financial reporting score is based on recommendations of the capital market regulator (Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal dan Lembaga Keuangan (BABEPAM)) given to firms to disclose approximately 650 items, separately for each industry. In contrast, the descriptives show that half of the firms only disclose 60% or less of the items recommended, indicating that firms themselves do not see high disclosure as an important factor in the Indonesian capital market. Although Siaigan et al. (2013) control their analyses for some market-based attributes they omit the valuation role of net dividends entirely. Rees and Valentincic (2013) show that for a 'traditional' capital market (the UK) net dividends do play an important role in both firm valuation and future profitability when core earnings -presumably the earnings figure that is relevant to capital market participants -are not taken into account appropriately. Hutagaol-Martowidjojo and Valentincic (2016) build on this literature and show that in the Indonesian capital markets: i) dividends displace the role of accounting numbers in the valuation of equity of Indonesian firms entirely; ii) EM is positively, rather than negatively, related to the market value of equity, particularly after the second Indonesian crisis in 2002, after the introduction of independent directors in 2001, and using -essentially -high-quality international accounting standards (IAS).
1 Incidentally, this is also the period in which the BAPEPAM recommendations were issued (Siagian et al. 2013) .
Earlier literature also reports evidence consistent with these findings. For example, Davis-Friday et al. (2006) show that after the Asian crisis of 1995-96, the value relevance of earnings decreased dramatically. Siagian and Tresnaningsih (2011) report that the introduction of independent board directors has increased the earnings response coefficients (consistent with increased relevance of earnings for the capital market). However, the change only appears to be temporary. Graham and King (2000) do report that accounting book value and residual earnings are positively and significantly related to current stock prices, evidence that is consistent with a positive relation between market values and accounting. An international study by Gaio and Raposo (2011) also includes Indonesian firms, but individual-country results are not presented. Indonesia is also omitted from the Ball et al. (2003) study of East Asian countries, although for issues of research design (accounting standards vs. legal origins). Common to all these is that they are all executed on relatively old data samples -despite their publications dates, they end at best in 2004 and are relatively limited cross-sectionally and in time-series. This is an issue, as the output of the financial reporting process, the way the capital market views financial statements and even the way firms interact with their owners via dividend payouts, have all changed significantly in the last 15 years (see, e.g., Figure 2 in Hutagaol-Martowidjojo and Valentincic 2016) . Arguably the most visible change has been the wide introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Indonesia has not as yet formally adopted IFRS. However, it has historically adopted IAS and then strived to eliminate differences with IFRS through time in part due to pressure from the International Monetary Fund after the 2002 crisis (Chua and Taylor 2008) . The current state as of 2017 is that the Financial Accounting Standards Board (Dewan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan) is committed to adopting IFRS with a one-year delay until Indonesia decides to formally adopt IFRS (IAS Plus, 24.9.2017) . In this respect, Kabir et al. (2010) examine the changes in the EQ of New Zealand firms. They find that absolute discretionary accruals of New Zealand firms increase in the IFRS adoption period relative to pre-IFRS, suggesting that EQ is lower after the adoption of IFRS. Implicit in our analyses is thus also the impact of the changes of financial reporting standards on the relationship between EQ and market valuations.
Aside from the issue of changing accounting regulations, the lack of contemporaneous empirical evidence regarding the role of accounting and financial reporting in the Indonesian capital market is economically difficult to understand. The sheer size and importance of the Indonesian capital market and economy (market capitalisation US$353 billion, at the end of 2015, 0.56% of world market capitalisation, 41.0% of Indonesian GDP in 2015; World Bank 2017; World Federation of Exchanges 2017) and the economy (0.45% of world GDP in 2015; World Bank 2017) essentially requires a large-scale study on the relation between EQ and the market value of Indonesian listed firms. This research responds to this requirement.
We use 10 common measures of EQ based on either accounting values only or on market views of certain attributes of the financial reporting process. The large array of measures is required to capture different aspects of EQ. Accounting-based earnings attributes are superior to market-based earnings attributes, as reflected in their significant impact on the cost of equity (Francis et al. 2004) . However, the market-based earnings attributes are also essential since they reflect the response of the capital market as the main user of firms' financial statements -the output of the financial reporting process. We relate firm-level EQ measures to market valuations expressed as Tobin's Q of the aggregate EQ measure and individual EQ measures, with and without conventional controls such as size, and controls that are related to the Indonesian capital market (ownership concentration, including family ownership, status as a former state-owned enterprise, etc.), included to a certain extent in previous literature and hence necessary to ensure comparability of our research with the previous literature.
We use a large sample of 438 distinct firms listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (IDX) during the period 1995-2015 yielding a total of 3748 firm-year observations. We show that EQ is reliably negatively linked to the market valuation of firms listed on the IDX. The result is robust regardless of whether we consider it in isolation, or after introducing accounting, market and governance controls. The effect persists beyond contemporaneous relations; future valuations also are negatively correlated with EQ. The results related to control variables are interesting on their own. We find that firms that pay out dividends are valued significantly higher, a finding consistent with the central role dividends play in the Indonesian capital market (see Hutagaol-Martowidjojo and Valentincic 2016) . Conversely, firms issuing new equity (net of repurchases) are valued lower. The absolute size of the coefficient indicates that this effect goes beyond the simple dividend displacement theorem. Debt levels do not affect valuations, but higher interest expense results in higher valuations, a finding that is likely a direct result of the tax shield interest expenses generate.
Large firms are valued higher than small firms. In terms of risk and the information environment, we report an anomalous finding that shares with higher variability of share prices (idiosyncratic risk) are valued higher, but shares with higher systematic risk measured via CAPM beta, are valued lower, as are shares where the variability of volume of shares traded is more volatile.
2 In terms of governance variables, privatised former stateowned enterprises are valued significantly lower than firms originating from the private sector. However, firms with more concentrated ownership are valued higher. We stress that these findings, while interesting and important on their own, do not change the principal finding vis-à-vis EQ.
Measures of Earnings Quality

Accounting-based measures of earnings quality
The first measure of earnings quality rests on the reasoning that economic losses should be more transitory while economic gains should be (more) persistent (Basu 1997; Ball and Shivakumar 2005) . Several existing papers report that persistence is among the most important EQ measures. For example, Francis et al. (2004) find that among the accounting-based earnings quality properties, persistence is the second most significant attribute from investors' perspective regarding information risks. Dichev et al. (2013) further conclude that earnings persistence is placed first on CFOs' responses regarding desirable earnings properties. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2011) assert that persistence is one of the EQ properties that provides the best measure of earnings capability in a diminishing markets' doubts about firms' value. We employ increases in reported bottom-line net income (NI) to proxy for economic gains and decreases in reported net income to proxy for economic losses. We estimate this asymmetric persistence as:
where DUM = 1 if NI t-1 ࣘ 0. High EQ requires α 2 = 0 (gains (earnings increases) are persistent, permanent at the extreme) and α 3 < 0 (losses (earnings decreases) are transitory). The measure of earnings quality based on equation (1) is defined as: PERS i = −(α 2 +α 3 ). As is conventional in the existing literature, we multiply this measure by −1 so that higher values of PERS indicate lower EQ. We adopt this convention throughout. The measures are defined at firm level, as firm-specific estimation is required to produce EQ measures at firm level. The next two measures focus on two roles of accruals in the financial reporting process (Ball and Shivakumar 2006) . First, accruals mitigate the variability in operating cash flow due to the mismatches between revenues (expenses) and cash inflows (cash outlays) (Dechow 1994) . This results in a negative contemporaneous correlation between accruals and operating cash flow. Second, accruals facilitate timely recognition of economic gains and losses. This second role of accruals leads to a positive incremental contemporaneous correlation between accruals and cash flow:
where DUM = 1 if CFO t ࣘ0. CFO is operating cash flow and is available directly through Worldscope. ACC is total accruals, calculated as bottom-line net income less operating cash flow ACC = NI -CFO. Ball and Shivakumar (2006) make the following predictions: β 2 < 0 (negative correlation -accruals mitigate variability in operating cash flow and reverse in subsequent period), β 3 >0 (positive correlation -source of positive but asymmetric correlation between accruals and contemporaneous cash flow). A strong positive incremental correlation in the case of loss recognition arises because future cash flows from an individual long-term asset tend to be correlated over time, or 'persistent' . Based on equation (2) we define two measures of EQ: ROLE1 i = β 2 and ROLE2 i = −β 3 . ROLE2 requires multiplication by −1 as the existing literature shows that write-offs may be (and are in some instances) used as an earnings-management tool rather than for timely recognition of losses, resulting thus in a negative β 3 (Valentincic 2015) . The fourth and fifth measures of EQ are based on the short version of the Barth et al. (2001) model in their equation (12), but are longer than the most compact version. High-quality earnings are more able to predict future operating cash flows than low-quality earnings. (Earnings) predictability is one of the components of relevance, which is the primary qualitative characteristics of financial reporting based on the Conceptual Framework (Francis et al. 2004 ). We decompose current earnings in its two main components thereby allowing the coefficient on operating cash flow and accruals to vary (Barth et al. 2001; Ball and Shivakumar 2006) :
The two measures based on equation (3) are PRED1 i = −γ 3 and PRED2 i = −γ 4 ; better-quality earnings are more able to predict future cash flows, lesser-quality earnings are less able to predict future cash flows. Thus, in principle, the lower the coefficient the worse the EQ. To follow the convention, we multiply by −1 so that higher values of PRED1 and PRED2 indicate lower EQ.
We use Dechow and Dichev's (2002) measure of accruals quality to generate our sixth measure of EQ. We model changes in working capital ( WCA t ) on previous, current and future period cash flow from operations (CFO). Future cash flow as an explanatory variable controls for unrealised gains and losses:
EQ is represented by the residual of the model (e t ), which captures anything in accruals that is unrelated to cash flow realisations, so higher residuals denote lower accounting quality. Accruals should be negatively related to current cash flows (−1<β 2 <0) as they mitigate the noise in CFO due to the mismatches between revenue/expense and cash flow (Dechow 1994) , and positively correlated to preceding and past period CFO (0<β 1 <1, 0<β 3 <1). For our purposes of capturing EQ, higher R 2 from this regression indicates higher accounting quality and higher deviation of residuals indicates low EQ: AQ i = σ(e i ).
As a final accounting-based measure of EQ, we employ smoothness of earnings relative to smoothness of operating cash flow. We calculate the ratio of standard deviation of reported bottom-line earnings within a year and standard deviation of operating cash flow for each firm i: SMOOTH i = −(σ(NI i ) / σ(CFO i )). It captures the extent to which a firm's financial reporting process is able to attenuate the variability of reported earnings via the accruals processes to lessen the variability in their true economic performance. Higher values of this measure indicate more earnings smoothing. We stress that the literature does not view earnings smoothness uniformly. Some studies in the existing literature view smoothness as a desirable quality of the financial reporting process (e.g., Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Dou et al. 2013) , and others view it as an indication of earnings management (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; Burgstahler et al. 2006 ). Gassen and Fülbier (2015: 163) stress that 'it is unclear whether income smoothing is positive or negative in terms of accounting quality' . In this paper, we adopt the general convention and view smoothness as an indicator of poor quality (Valentincic et al. 2017) . Hence, we multiply the ratio of standard deviations by −1.
We note that the choice of EQ measures is in part limited by firm-level estimation. Further disaggregation of some of the models is possible and does indeed appear in the existing literature. However, more developed models consume more degrees of freedom. Hence, we opt for more compact versions of the models.
Market-based measures of earnings quality
We employ market-based measures of EQ based on two different models of the relation between accounting earnings and market attributes. The first model is the value-relevance model based on Francis and Schipper (1999) . In general, value relevance refers to the degree to which accounting earnings summarise information impounded in stock prices (e.g. , Brown Jr. et al. 2006) . Earnings are regarded as high quality if they are able to explain the firm's share prices and/or share returns (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2011) . Value relevance is perceived as a direct measure of decision usefulness due to its ability to capture information relevance and reliability, which are two important criteria of financial reporting (Francis and Schipper 1999) . Ewert and Wagenhofer (2011) document that value relevance is closely aligned with EQ (followed by persistence -see above). Additionally, Perotti and Wagenhofer (2014) find that the measure of value relevance, earnings response coefficient (ERC), is negatively related to absolute excess returns, which are a proxy for share mispricing due to low-quality information. The model we employ is:
where RET is market return. To maintain comparability with the existing literature (e.g., Gaio and Raposo 2011), we calculate RET in the window beginning at the start of the fiscal year and ending six months after the balance sheet date. Returns are inclusive of dividends. The measure of EQ is the adjusted R 2 : RELEV i = −R 2 adj.,I . As for the accounting-based measures, higher values (closer to zero) indicate lower quality.
The second model is the Basu (1997) and Pope and Walker (1999) model of asymmetric timeliness of earnings in respect to good and bad economic news. Timelier incorporation of losses precludes management's motivation to engage in non-profitable investment projects. Timely loss recognition also gives earlier forewarning to creditors for signals of debt covenant violations and correspondingly allows for faster follow-up by both lenders and firms (e.g., Dechow et al. 2010; Ball and Shivakumar 2006) . The model we employ is:
where DUM = 1 if RETࣘ0, that is, when bad economic news is reflected in market returns. The two measures of EQ are earnings timeliness TIMEL i = −R 2 adj. and conditional conservatism, expressed as the ratio between (total) coefficients that capture bad news and good news:
Aggregate measures of earnings quality
We aggregate the above 10 firm-level measures of EQ into a single measure by: i) ranking individual measures in centiles; ii) summing the ranks by firm and calculating the average ranking of individual EQ measures. Higher (average) rankings indicate higher EQ. We present the Pearson's correlation matrix between pairs of EQ measures in Table 1.   3 Although individual correlations are occasionally significant, the overall structure suggests that the 10 EQ measures capture different aspects of the financial reporting process.
Method
For each measure of EQ, we run firm-level regressions in equations (1) to (7) (see below) using the longest time series available. We require at least five consecutive observations per firm. This ensures a reasonable Bold estimates are significant at 5% or better. PERS is persistence from equation (1); ROLE1 and ROLE2 refer to the two roles of accruals -mitigating the mismatch between cash inflows and outflows, and indication of changes in expectations about future cash flows respectively, in equation (2); PRED1 and PRED2 refer to the predictability of future operating cash flows by current earnings, split into its current operating cash flow component and accrual component, respectively, in equation (3); AQ is the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (4); SMOOTH is the ratio of standard deviation of net income versus standard deviation of operating cash flow (calculated directly, not from any estimated regression models); RELEV refers to earnings relevance based on equation (5); TIMEL is timeliness of earnings, and CONSER is a measure of conditional conservatism, both measures based on equation (6). All measures are estimated from firm-level regression based on the sample presented in Table 2 .
balance between stability of estimates and data attrition issues. Based on estimated regression parameters we then calculate individual EQ measures. Where required, we multiply the estimated parameters by −1 so that higher values indicate lower EQ. We then aggregate the 10 firm-level measures of EQ into a single measure by: i) ranking individual measures in centiles; ii) summing the ranks by firm and calculating the average ranking of individual EQ measures. Higher (average) rankings indicate higher EQ. We present the Pearson's correlation matrix between pairs of estimated EQ measures in Table 1 . Although individual correlations are occasionally significant, the overall structure suggests that the 10 EQ measures capture different aspects of the financial reporting process and are hence collectively indicative of the overall EQ.
In the second step we relate Tobin's Q to the aggregate measure of EQ and the control variables. Tobin's Q is defined as:
where BVA is book value of total assets, MVE is market capitalisation of equity measured at six months after the balance sheet date, and BVE is the book value of equity. We rank Tobin's Q into centiles in the same way as with individual EQ measures. We then estimate the following regression (shown here in the longest version):
Other than the variables already defined above, the following are new in equation (7): DIV is cash dividends to common equity. NETCAP is net recapitalisation defined as share repurchases less issues of new equity. INTEXP is interest expense. All accounting variables are deflated by opening total assets. DE is the debt-to-equity ratio, calculated by using long-term financial debt, short-term financial debt and the current part of long-term financial debt. SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation measured six months after the balance sheet date to ensure that all value-relevant data from financial statements is impounded in share prices. CVPRICE and CVVOL are the coefficients of variation of daily price changes and daily number of shares traded standardised by the mean of each of these variables and calculated over the window (−12,+6) months relative to the balance sheet date. This is to maintain comparability with the existing literature.
4 BETA is a short-window version of the systematic risk measure measured over 52 weeks rather than the conventional 60-month estimation. Requiring longer time series of market data would result in a significant loss in the number of observations. To strike the balance between losing too many observations and maximising the inclusion of important control variables, we opted for this short-window beta. FSOE is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm is a former state-owned enterprise (SOE). To the extent that former SOEs maintain political connections, in particular if institutions do not perform efficiently, this may result in political connectedness of firms that in turn has been shown to have a negative effect on performance (Domadenik et al. 2016) . The percentage of closely held shares (CLOSE) is defined by Worldscope as shares that are held by insiders (officers, family members, pension funds, individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares, etc.) Although it is not a oneto-one correspondence, the inclusion of this variable is important at least to the extent that the risk-return relation is different for family firms. For example, the total required rate of return is higher for family firms due to the 'emotional return' family members require (see overview in Hasso and Duncan 2013) . Concentration may originate from former SOE status (Hoang et al. 2015) , so both variables are required as a governance control.
Sample Formation
We collect accounting data from Worldscope via Thomson Datastream, and market-related data through Datastream. To enter our sample, the firms must have available: (i) the main accounting variables required to construct EQ measures (net income, total assets, cash flow from operations, accruals); (ii) a market price at six months after the balance sheet date. (We measure the market value of firms at this interval because Indonesian firms should report the results three months after the balance sheet date. However, a manual inspection of the data reveals that this is not the case (as in Hutagaol and Valentincic 2016). To ensure that the impact of the most recent financial statements is impounded in share prices, we execute the analyses at six months after the balance sheet date); and (iii) the industry must be known. (Data quality is an issue using Indonesian data.) Accordingly, we perform a number of manual checks/visual inspections in an attempt to ensure that the data are as error-free as possible. Years before 1995 are discarded, as there were too many missing values in variables required to conduct a consistent analysis throughout the paper. We exclude firms with negative book value. These firms are technically bankrupt, non-representative of a typical firm and their valuations may differ from valuations of normal firms. Outliers outside the top/bottom 1% of distributions of continuous variables are removed from the sample (for variables bounded at zero, only observations exceeding the 99th percentile are removed). A summary of the sample formation procedure is presented in Table 2 .
To study the relations between Tobin's Q and EQ, additional data items are required. The data for the dummy variable FSOE were hand-collected from IDX data (in the local language -Bahasa Indonesia). Additional manual inspection reveals significant outliers in the shortwindow beta variable (BETA). These are restricted to the interval −2 ࣘ BETA ࣘ +2. A total of three firmyear observations are affected at the negative end and 108 observations at the upper end of the original BETA distribution. As a special case, ownership concentration (CLOSE) is often reported in every second year and is typically missing in the first and last period when the firm is covered by Worldscope. We substitute missing values with first next/last previously available value.
The final sample includes 3748 firm-year observations, representing 438 distinct firms in non-financial industries and 21 years of data (Year 2016 is also required for forward values of some variables.) For some of the analyses, the sample is more restricted as not all variables are available for all firms in all years. The average (median) duration of a firm in the sample is 8.5 (8.0) years.
Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics
We first provide a condensed overview of the properties of firms in the sample. In Figure 1 we show the DuPont decomposition of ROE of sample firms by year. Median yearly ROE of the firms in the sample is decomposed into profit margin (net income/sales), asset turnover ratio (sales/total assets) and the inverse of equity multiplierthe 'wide' debt-to-total asset ratio ('wide' in the sense that it includes operating liabilities and replaces the total asset-to-equity multiplier for expositional purposes). The following aspects stand out. The effects of the Asian crisis are clearly visible (1997), and so is the effect of the Median values of financial ratios per year of firms included in the sample are shown. ROE is return on equity, profit margin is defined as bottom-line net income divided by net revenue, asset turnover is current-period total assets divided by net revenue, and EQ is the inverse of the current-period total assets divided by the current-period book value of equity (i.e., total debt to total asset ratio, where debt includes operating debt). 5 Over half of the firms pay out dividends, with an average payout ratio of 25.6%. Table 3 provides further details about the properties of firms in the sample. It provides the description of the main variables and control variables. The statistics are pooled over the 1995-2015 sample period. The mean (median) Tobin's Q is 1.8 (1.2) indicating that the market value of assets is higher than the book value of assets. Operating cash flows are 7.8% of opening total assets, total accruals are negative −2.8% of opening total assets to yield a positive net return on opening total assets of 5.0%. Market returns are highly positively skewed, indicating that most shares generate relatively small returns (the median is 7.7%, inclusive of dividends), but that the returns of some firms are extremely high. 4.5% of firms are former SOEs. The mean (median) percentage of closely held shares is 67.2% (70.0%). Table 4 shows bivariate Pearson's correlation coefficients. The dotted line delimits the main variables of interest from the control variables. The reported correlations are within normal limits and are relatively higher only in cases where they are so by mechanic reasonsfor example, between operating cash flows and reported net income, and between operating cash flows and total accruals and working capital accruals.
Tobin's Q and the aggregate EQ measure
We report in Table 5 the empirical results of estimating the model in equation (7). The first column contains only the aggregate EQ measure constructed from individual aspects presented above. The second column introduces accounting variables that the existing literature reports as important in determining the relation between market values and accounting numbers and attributes (e.g., Hutagaol-Martowidjojo and Valentincic 2016; Rees and Valentincic 2013; Akbar and Stark 2003) . Column 3 reports the relation between Tobin's Q and EQ controlled for typical market-related attributes: idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, information environment and two governance attributes: the percentage of closely held shares and firm status as a former SOE. Column 4 is reported for control purposes. Not all values of variables included in various versions of the models are reported. In column 4 we thus enter only those variables that have the full set 
is as: Q i,t = (B V A i,t + MV E i,t − B V E i,t )/B V A i,t
where BVA is the book value of total assets, MVE is the market capitalisation of equity measured at six months after the balance sheet date, and BVE is the book value of equity; NI is reported bottom-line net income, LOSS is an indicator variable taking the value one if NIࣘ0; NI is change in net income, DUM1 is an indicator variable taking the value one if NIࣘ0; OCF is reported operating cash flow; ACC is total accruals, calculated as ACC = NI -CFO; DUM2 is an indicator variable taking the value one if OCFࣘ0; WCA is working capital accruals; RET is total return calculated over the window (−12,+6) months relative to the balance sheet date, inclusive of dividends; DIV is dividends to common equity, NETCAP is net recapitalisation defined as share repurchases less issues of new equity, INTEXP is interest expense, DE is the debt-to-equity ratio, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation measured six months after the balance sheet date, CVPRICE and CVVOL are the coefficients of variation of daily price changes and daily number of shares traded standardised by the mean of each of these variables and calculated over the window (−12,+6) months relative to the balance sheet date, BETA is a short-window version of the systematic risk measure, FSOE is an indicator variable that takes the value one if a firm is a former SOE, CLOSE is the percentage of closely held shares (officers, family members, pension funds, individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares, etc.). All accounting variables are deflated by opening total assets.
of data available. We immediately note that qualitatively these results are exactly the same as those reported in other versions of the model in (7). Finally, column 5 makes use of all controls at the same time.
The regressions are estimated as pooled with year fixed effects. We note that the underlying estimations of individual EQ measures are estimated at the firm level.
The main finding of the analyses reported in Table 5 is that EQ is reliably negatively correlated with the market valuation of firms listed on the IDX. This result is robust regardless of whether we consider it in isolation, or when we introduce variables that represent accounting, market and governance controls separately or collectively. While the absolute size of the estimated regression coefficients does generally decrease as we introduce more controls, the significant negative correlation between Tobin's Q and EQ does not vanish. Indeed, as the adjusted R 2 increases from 6.3% to 51.3%, the results suggest that the control variables are interesting on their own to explain the variation in the market valuation of Indonesian firms.
We find that firms that pay out more dividends are valued significantly higher, a finding consistent with the central role dividends play on the Indonesian capital market (see Hutagaol-Martowidjojo and Valentincic 2016) . The size of the coefficient shows, in the first instance, that dividend displacement does not hold on the Indonesian capital market. More importantly, there is a significant component of the market value of firms that is captured by net dividends rather than the accounting system. Given that the coefficient on EQ is negative, the role net dividends serve in the Indonesian capital market is even more important than what was previously 
where BVA is the book value of total assets, MVE is the market capitalisation of equity measured at six months after the balance sheet date, and BVE is the book value of equity; NI is the reported bottom-line net income; OCF is the reported operating cash flow; ACC is total accruals, calculated as ACC = NI -CFO; RET is the total return calculated over the window (−12,+6) months relative to the balance sheet date, inclusive of dividends; DIV is dividends to common equity, NETCAP is net recapitalisation defined as share repurchases less issues of new equity, INTEXP is interest expense, DE is the debt-to-equity ratio, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation measured six months after the balance sheet date, CVPRICE and CVVOL are the coefficients of variation of daily price changes and daily number of shares traded standardised by the mean of each of these variables and calculated over the window (−12,+6) months relative to the balance sheet date, BETA is a short-window version of the systematic risk measure, FSOE is an indicator variable that takes the value one if a firm is a former SOE, CLOSE is the percentage of closely held shares (officers, family members, pension funds, individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares, etc.). All accounting variables are deflated by opening total assets. The dotted line delineates the main variables from the control variables.
reported. Dividends must first reflect core earnings as reported in the literature, but must then also compensate for the weaknesses in the financial reporting process. Relative to the existing literature, this result reveals a stronger role for net dividends on capital markets. Net dividends take on a more important role relative to instances where accruals quality is reported to be positively related to dividend policies (e.g., Rampershad and de Villiers 2018) . Firms issuing new equity (net of repurchases) are valued lower, but the size of the coefficient is again inconsistent with dividend displacement. Growth opportunities as expressed by current capital investment are positively correlated with Tobin's Q. Interestingly, relative debt levels do not affect valuations, but higher interest expenses do result in higher valuations, a finding that is likely a result of the tax shield interest expenses generate. Large firms are valued higher than small firms. This is consistent with interpretations that relate to the political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1978) . Some ways in which this hypothesis could manifest include (Wilson 2010) : i) pricing of products (Lim and Matolcsy 1999) ; ii) tax considerations (Monem 2003; Wilson and Shailer 2007; Garrod et al. 2008) ; and iii) employee relations (Godfrey and Jones 1999; Kosi and Valentincic 2013) . If managers face the possibility of politically imposed wealth transfers (e.g., taxes, government subsidies, tariffs, etc.) they will choose accounting procedures that reduce the expected value of the transfer, through reducing either its size, its likelihood or both (Cahan 1992) . This would decrease EQ, but result in higher equity valuations. A larger firm may be better positioned to exploit its political power via any of these non-exhaustive channels. The issue of the political connections of Indonesian firms has indeed been reported in the literature (see Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006) .
In terms of risk and information environment, we report an anomalous finding that shares with higher variability of share price (idiosyncratic risk) are valued higher. Higher valuations of shares with higher idiosyncratic risk are consistent with a higher option value of firms, as volatility increases option value in the Black and Sholes (1973) model. Shares with higher systematic risk, measured via CAPM beta, and shares where the variability of the volume of shares traded is more volatile, are valued lower, consistent with finance theory. 6 In terms of governance variables, privatised former SOEs are valued significantly lower than firms originating from the private sector. This may be because these firms might not yet have had the time to restructure in a way that would maximise their value (e.g., Domadenik et al. 2008) . However, firms with more concentrated ownership are valued higher. We stress that these findings, while interesting and important on their own, do not change the principal finding vis-à-vis EQ. Estimated regression coefficients are shown. t-statistics are in parentheses, bold estimates are significant at 5% or better, levels of significance denoted as: * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001. The estimated regression model is:
Variables are defined as follows. TOBINQ is the centile ranking of Tobin's Q defined as:
where BVA is the book value of total assets, MVE is the market capitalisation of equity measured at six months after the balance sheet date, and BVE is the book value of equity; EQ(aggregate) is the simple average of individual EQ measures centile rankings. Higher values by convention indicate lower EQ. DIV is dividends to common equity, NETCAP is net recapitalisation defined as share repurchases less issues of new equity, INTEXP is interest expense, DE is the debt-to-equity ratio, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation measured six months after the balance sheet date, CVPRICE and CVVOL are the coefficients of variation of daily price changes and daily number of shares traded standardised by the mean of each of these variables and calculated over the window (−12,+6) months relative to the balance sheet date, BETA is a short-window version of the systematic risk measure, FSOE is an indicator variable that takes the value one if a firm is a former SOE, CLOSE is the percentage of closely held shares (officers, family members, pension funds, individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares, etc.). All accounting variables are deflated by opening total assets.
Tobin's Q and individual EQ measures
We indicated in Table 4 that the 10 EQ measures likely capture different aspects of EQ and of the financial reporting processes in general as the correlations between pairs of individual EQ measures are generally low. However, which aspects in particular are important for the Indonesian capital market is of interest and relevant to market participants and researchers. We hence repeat the analyses by including in our regression models the 10 individual EQ measures instead of a single, aggregate measure. The results are presented in Table 6 (and are directly comparable to the results reported in Table 5 ).
The first finding that stands out is that, to a certain extent, various aspects of EQ are captured by the control variables.
7 Hence, the inclusion of control variables is required. This is evidenced by the fact that with the exception of the earnings timeliness construct (TIMEL), the other individual measures are not uniformly statistically significant in Table 6 (however, the signs are generally preserved and do not change direction in a statistically significant manner as one varies the controls). The most important aspect of EQ appears to be earnings timeliness, that is, the extent to which economic news is captured by the accounting system. The fact that the accounting system is generally able to reflect the economics of the firm is valued by the market.
8 However, This table shows the estimated regression coefficients. t-statistics are in parentheses, bold estimates are significant at 5% or better, levels of significance are denoted as: * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001. The estimated regression model is:
where BVA is the book value of total assets, MVE is the market capitalisation of equity measured at six months after the balance sheet date, and BVE is the book value of equity; EQ(measures) are individual EQ measures centile rankings: PERS is persistence from equation (1); ROLE1 and ROLE2 refer to the two roles of accruals -mitigating the mismatch between cash inflows and outflows, and indication of changes in expectations about future cash flows respectively, in equation (2); PRED1 and PRED2 refer to the predictability of future operating cash flows by current earnings, split into the current operating cash flow component and accrual component, respectively, in equation (3); AQ is the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (4); SMOOTH is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income versus the standard deviation of operating cash flow (calculated directly, not from any estimated regression models); RELEV refers to earnings relevance based on equation (5); TIMEL is timeliness of earnings, and CONSER is a measure of conditional conservatism, both measures based on equation (6). Higher values by convention indicate lower EQ. DIV is dividends to common equity, NETCAP is net recapitalisation defined as share repurchases less issues of new equity, INTEXP is interest expense, DE is the debt-to-equity ratio, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation measured six months after the balance sheet date, CVPRICE and CVVOL are the coefficients of variation of daily price changes and daily number of shares traded standardised by the mean of each of these variables and calculated over the window (−12,+6) months relative to the balance sheet date, BETA is a short-window version of the systematic risk measure, FSOE is an indicator variable that takes the value one if a firm is a former SOE, CLOSE is the percentage of closely held shares (officers, family members, pension funds, individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares, etc.). All accounting variables are deflated by opening total assets.
bad economic news timeliness is not a particularly valued attribute, in stark contrast to the existing literature (e.g., Basu 1997; Pope and Walker 1999; Garcia Lara et al. 2016) . On the other hand, the negative timeliness effect on valuation is also reported in Barth et al. (2017) . Although they use a different measure of timeliness, they provide evidence that there is an inverse relationship between asymmetric timeliness and the speed of the agreement of the market and market uncertainty, that, in turn, will affect the market valuation of the firms. Measure ROLE2 reveals an interesting aspect of the role of the financial reporting process on the Indonesian stock exchange. The second role of accruals as described in Ball and Shivakumar (2006) is to reveal the expectations about future cash flows from long-term asset trends that tend to be correlated over time. For instance, a write-off today should reflect decreases in expected future cash flows over several future periods, thus leading to a positive correlation between current negative accruals (write-offs) and future decreases in operating cash flows. Instead, the sign is negative -when the accounting system functions as intended, market valuation of assets is lower and, conversely, when the accounting system serves purposes other than revealing true performance, it appears to be rewarded rather than penalised by the market. This is a finding that is consistent with write-offs playing an important role as an earnings management tool, as has been shown in the existing literature for firms where external control is weak as in privately held firms (Garrod et al. 2008; Kosi and Valentincic 2013; Szczesny and Valentincic 2013) . This finding is also complemented by the positive sign on PRED2. When the ability of accruals to predict future cash flows decreases, market valuation of assets increases, a finding that is again inconsistent with reporting true performance, but consistent with using the financial reporting process for discretionary motives. Related to the role of accruals in the financial reporting process we note that without extensive controls the sign of ROLE1 is positive -accruals do not appear to mitigate the mismatch between cash inflows and outflows. Even after extensive controls are introduced (columns 5 and 6) the estimated regression coefficient on this variable becomes negative and still an order of magnitude lower than reported elsewhere in the literature.
All other aspects discussed in the previous section remain unchanged. Despite a relatively comprehensive collection of individual aspects of EQ, net dividends and size still play an overwhelming role in the valuation of Indonesian firms.
Additional analyses
The contemporaneous correlation between Tobin's Q and EQ measures (and also some control variables in equation (7)) reflect in part the same underlying accounting constructs. To address this issue, we use the leading (forward) Tobin's Q rather than the contemporaneous Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. The results remain essentially qualitatively unchanged. The only difference is that the interest expense variable is now statistically insignificant along with the debt-to-equity ratio, as in the main results.
Next, we study how individual measures evolve through time. We estimate models in equations (1) to (6) for each year in the sample period and calculate the EQ measures for each cross-section. We only use observations that appear in the sample used in the main analyses for comparability. The estimated EQ measures (not regression coefficients) are presented in Figure  2 ; each panel corresponds to one of the equations plus the measure SMOOTH, which is calculated directly. For each measure, we also report the time trend. Increasing trends indicate that through time, EQ as expressed via a particular attribute is decreasing.
We find that in general EQ decreases through time. Even after omitting the years of the Asian crisis (1997) and the second Indonesian crisis (2002), the trend of most of the EQ measures appears to decrease. This finding is important, as Indonesia adopted 21 IAS in 1994, that is, immediately prior to our sample period, renaming them Indonesian Financial Accounting Standards (IFAS) and making them mandatory for all public companies (Saudagaran and Diga 2000: 8; Davis-Friday et al. 2006) . Both private and public firms are obliged to use IFAS as set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (Dewan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan) under the Indonesian Institute of Accountants (Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia). Indonesia has strived to eliminate differences with the IFRS, in part under pressure from the International Monetary Fund following the 2002 crisis (Chua and Taylor 2008) . The current situation as of 2017 is that the Dewan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan is committed to adopting IFRS with a one-year delay until Indonesia decides to fully and formally adopt IFRS (IAS Plus, 24.9.2017). Thus, despite high-quality international standards, other features of the Indonesian capital market not only prevail, but are becoming more, rather than less, important through time vis-à-vis accounting standards (Ball et al. 2003) .
We also conduct a number of sensitivity analyses. The findings we report are not sensitive to time-fixed effects despite a period of time with significantly changing market conditions and financial reporting processes. Clustering of standard errors weakens the results somewhat, but the main conclusions remain intact. In a similar vein, controlling for industry-fixed effects does reduce statistical significance in some cases, but not the general findings. We stress that the estimation of EQ is executed at firm level in a time series and so is originally controlled for type of industry. Finally, expressing the variables in Linear time trends of individual EQ measures are shown. The panels are grouped by origin of estimated regression coefficients/adj. R2s/residuals/other parameters required to calculate individual measures. PERS is persistence from equation (1):
and ROLE2 refer to the two roles of accruals -mitigating the mismatch between cash inflows and outflows, and indication of changes in expectations about future cash flows respectively, in equation (2): ACC t = β 0 + β 1 DUM + β 2 CFO t + β 3 DUM · CFO t + e t ; PRED1 and PRED2 refer to predictability of future operating cash flows by current earnings, split into the current operating cash flow component and accrual component, respectively, in equaton (3): CFO t+1 = γ 0 + γ 3 CFO t + γ 4 ACC t + e t ; AQ is the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (4): WCA t = β 0 + β 1 CFO t−1 + β 2 CFO t + β 3 CFO t+1 + e t ; SMOOTH is the ratio of the standard deviation of net income versus the standard deviation of operating cash flow (calculated directly, not from any estimated regression models): SMOOTH i = −(σ(NI i )/σ(CFO i )); RELEV refers to earnings relevance based on equation (5): RET i,t = α 0,i + α 1,i NI i,t + α 2,i NI i,t + e i ; TIMEL is timeliness of earnings, and CONSER is a measure of conditional conservatism, both measures based on equation (6): terms of centiles and in terms of levels of variables also does not change the inferences we make.
Summary and Conclusion
Despite the large size of the Indonesian capital market and the economy in general, the evidence thus far on the relation between accounting numbers and capital market valuations is scarce, limited in cross-section and relatively dated, thus ignoring several recent changes in the financial reporting environment. Here, we investigate the relation between EQ and Tobin's Q as a measure of firm valuation. We conduct a large sample, longwindow study. Our principal finding is that the relation between EQ and Tobin's Q is negative: the higher the EQ, the lower the market valuation of firms. The opposite of EQ is earnings management. When we view the results like this, we conclude that earnings management (low earnings quality) is viewed by the Indonesian capital market as efficient. Viewed in a time-series, several individual EQ measures indicate declining EQ. Even individual EQ measures whose values do not decrease uniformly overall, still indicate a tendency to decreasing EQ since the beginning of the financial crisis. This finding stands in stark contrast to the continuing adoption of high-quality IFRS. These relations persist even when we control for some aspects of the capital market and the financial reporting process that have been shown by earlier literature to be important in general and/or specifically in the Indonesian capital market. Most notably, even after controlling for the level of dividend payouts and net re-capitalisations (see Hutagaol-Martowidjojo 2015 for the importance of these variables on the Indonesian capital market), the negative relation between Tobin's Q and EQ still persists. Net dividends thus take on an even more important role relative to instances where accruals quality is reported to be positively related to dividend policies (e.g., Rampershad and de Villiers 2018) .
The debt-to-equity ratio does not influence the market valuation of assets, but interest expenses do as the tax shield is created. In terms of the risk and information environment, we report that shares carrying a higher systematic risk are valued less, but shares with higher idiosyncratic risk are valued more, consistent with increasing option value. Higher volume of shares traded (more uncertainty) is correlated negatively with market valuations. In terms of governance variables, former SOEs are valued significantly lower than firms originating from the private sector, and firms with more closed shareholders' structures are valued higher. These findings are consistent with the political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1978) .
Collectively, the results indicate that the mere adoption of high-quality accounting standards (IFRS) and other nominal changes in regulation do not automatically increase the quality of the financial reporting process (this in contrast to some of the results reported in the literature (e.g., Navarro-Garcia and Madrid-Guijarro 2014). The results also indicate that cost of equity holders due to attributes of the financial reporting process may be high(er) than is generally known (Barth et al. 2017) .
A comparison with earlier research indicates several areas that are potential targets for future research. Any detailed investigation of specific firm-level determinants of EQ (or its inverse, earnings management) would be welcome, in particular because existing research is relatively dated. Another important determinant is political connections, a possible -but not necessary -explanation between high ownership concentration and value (other than the alignment of incentives). We have also indicated that the option value of shares may be an important factor in pricing equity. As this result is persistent in the literature, it may be worth exploring in more detail. We also report that former SOEs are valued lower. Given all other controls used here, it is possible that these firms have not yet had the time to restructure in a way that would maximise their value (e.g., Domadenik et al. 2008) . Our dataset does not, unfortunately, allow us to study the effect of R&D expenditure; we do know, however, that this is typically an item that is valued by the capital market.
Notes
1 See the 'Empirical Results' section for details on accounting standards in Indonesia. While not strictly IFRS, in later years in particular they are to a large extent aligned with IFRS. 2 We note that the same, albeit weaker, findings are also reported in Hutagaol-Martowidjojo and Valentincic (2015) . 3 We adopt this unusual order of presenting the tables to keep content related to EQ measures together. We acknowledge that a more common way would be to discuss the correlation between pairs of EQ measures later. 4 For example, Gaio and Raposo (2011) also measure market variables over long windows, although they employ (-12, +3). Manual inspection of Indonesian data reveals that using only three months does not guarantee that the market is aware of accounting data. Hence, the window is moved to +6 months (as in HutagaolMartowidjojo and Valentincic 2016). 5 We note that data on R&D expenditures are not available for Indonesian firms. 6 We note that the same, albeit weaker, findings are reported in Hutagaol-Martowidjojo and Valentincic (2015) . We do not explore this fundamental issue further in this paper, but we note that this is indeed a possible avenue for future research. 7 Alternatively, but unlikely given the body of literature that indicates otherwise, individual factors may be irrelevant to market participants to determine value. 8 Please note that the TIMEL measure is multiplied by -1 to maintain consistency with the existing literature. Higher R 2 s indicate higher timeliness, which is viewed positively by the market (hence the negative sign of the estimated regression coefficient).
